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I. REMEDIES
-Consequences resulting from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin' proceeded apace in Michi-
gan during the Survey period. Both state2 and federal3 courts and
the Michigan legislature4 have responded to questions arising in
the wake of both that benchmark decision and the same Court's
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University; LL.B. 1965, University of
Illinois.-ED.
1. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2. Hill v.Michigan Nat'l Bank, 58 Mich. App. 430, 228 N.W.2d 407 (1975); Detroit &
N. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Woodworth, 54 Mich. App. 517, 221 N.W.2d 190 (1974).
3. Douglas Research & Chem., Inc. v. Solomon, 388 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
4. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.4001, .4011 (Supp. 1975-76); cf. MICH. GEN. CT.
R. 735, 738.
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apparent retrenchment from Fuentes' far reaching implications,
in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.5
Fuentes held that Florida and Pennsylvania pre-judgment
replevin statutes violated the fourteenth amendment because
they amounted to state participation in the deprivation of prop-
erty without benefit of notice and hearing, the indispensable prer-
equisites of due process. Thus, except in limited situations such
as those where the debtor cannot be reached by judicial process,
Fuentes outlaws ex parte prejudgment replevin. Fuentes was
presaged by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' which held the
Wisconsin prejudgment procedure for garnishing wages unconsti-
tutional for the same reasons. Both cases arose out of consumer
situations and may have reflected the growing concern that the
nation's laws were ignoring what some view as a judicial imbal-
ance against consumers. 7
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,8 a case involving Louisiana's
sequestration procedure, the Supreme Court ostensibly distin-
guished Fuentes on several grounds which merit attention. The
Court noted that the property sequestered in Mitchell was subject
to a vendor's lien (which corresponds to the Michigan Uniform
Commerical Code purchase money security interest),9 and con-
cluded, therefore, that with respect to the debtor,
His interest in the property, until the purchase price was paid in
full, was no greater than the surplus remaining, if any, after
foreclosure and sale of the property in the event of his default and
satisfaction of outstanding claims.'0
Thus the Court differentiated between the property subject to
the lien of the creditor and goods which are "exclusively the prop-
erty of the defendant debtor"' as the Court in Fuentes found that
5. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
6. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Revelos, Commercial Transactions, 1974 Ann.
Survey of Mich. Law, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 285 (1975); Comment, Self Help Repossession:
Fuentes and Judicial Process, 46 TEmp. L.Q. 540 (1973).
8. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
9. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9107 (1967).
10. 416 U.S. at 604.
11. Id.
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property to be. In addition, Mitchell distinguished the Louisiana
statute's procedural features' 2 which it held sufficient to meet
those requirements of due process which the Florida and Pennsyl-
vania statutes failed to satisfy.
In 1973, in response to Fuentes, the Michigan supreme court
amended court rule 757,13 relating to the claim and delivery stat-
ute," to provide for notice and a show cause hearing, thereby
satisfying the due process requirements of Fuentes.
A. Garnishment
It was in this setting that the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, in Douglas Research & Chemical,
Inc. v. Solomon,'5 held Michigan's prejudgment garnishment
statute6 unconstitutional. The statute, since amended,' 7 author-
ized the issuance of the garnishment writ on the affidavit, sup-
ported by facts, of a creditor who had filed suit, that he was justly
apprehensive of losing his claim if the writ did not issue. The
defendant in Solomon urged that Mitchell had overturned
Fuentes and that the Michigan procedure satisfied the require-
ments of Mitchell. The court recognized Mitchell as a retreat
from Fuentes but felt that Fuentes' vitality was sufficient to
merit a comparison of the factual distinctions on which Mitchell
ostensibly turned. The court pointed out the distinction,'" dis-
cussed earlier, that the creditor had a property interest, existing
quite apart from the sequestration statute, in the goods subject
to sequestration in Mitchell. In Fuentes on the other hand, the
creditor had no interest in the property which was subject to
replevin apart from those rights afforded him by the offensive
statute. Thus the bank deposit, the subject of garnishment in
Solomon, was closer in character to the goods, the subject of
12. Namely, that the affidavit of the creditor requires specific facts rather than conclu-
sions and that a judge, not a clerk, issued the writ. Id. 616. But see id. 631-33 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
13. MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 757.
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2920 (1968).
15. 388 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
16. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.4011 (1968).
17. Id. § 600.4011 (Supp. 1975-76). See note 21 & accompanying text infra.
18. For an application of the distinction to self-help, see text at notes 38-80 infra.
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replevin in Fuentes, than to the household goods, the subject of
sequestration in Mitchell. Solomon pointed out, furthermore,
that the Louisiana statute in Mitchell required the existence of a
vendor's lien before sequestration could apply, i.e., that both the
creditor and the debtor have "current real interests in the seques-
tered property."' 9
Solomon distinguished Mitchell on two further grounds: first,
that the hearing for dissolution contemplated by the Michigan
statute, unlike the Louisiana statute, did not reach the merits of
the creditor's principal claim but only the allegations of his ap-
prehension that he would lose his claim if the writ did not issue;
and second, that the Michigan statute, again unlike the
Louisiana sequestration act, failed to require the creditor to post
a bond.
While Justice White's use of Mitchell's distinctive facts to
justify a departure from Fuentes prompted criticism from some,"0
Judge Joiner's use of facts in Solomon to justify following Fuentes
should not. A fair reading of Mitchell leaves intact that portion
of Fuentes which prohibited a creditor, acting ex parte, from
depriving a debtor of property in which the creditor had no inter-
est when there had been no notice and hearing, the creditor had
posted no bond for the protection of the pecuniary loss suffered
by the debtor from wrongful deprivation, and there was no proce-
dure for prompt resolution of the underlying claim.
The Mitchell holding aside, arguments that Fuentes should
retain such force are compelling: the decision serves those policies
outlined in Sniadach and Fuentes without challenging assump-
tions of traditional methods of financing, as the dissenters in
Fuentes feared that case had done. A creditor who relies on prop-
erty of the debtor to secure his debt can comply with the provi-
sions of state law to obtain a proper lien, avoiding the necessity
of the notice and hearing commanded by Solomon and Mitchell.
It is not too much, moreover, to ask the creditor without such a
lien to stand ready to prove his case promptly and to post a bond
sufficient to indemnify the debtor in the event that he sustains
19. Douglas Research & Chem., Inc. v. Solomon, 388 F. Supp. 433, 436 (E.D. Mich.
1975).
20. E.g., Revelos, supra note 7, at 288.
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losses through the wrongful, temporary deprivation of his prop-
erty. The promptness requirement should be as much in the best
interests of the good faith creditor as of the debtor; the fraudulent
creditor, using the process in bad faith to harass his commercial
or personal adversary, will find these requirements stultifying.
The present posture of the Michigan statute makes these require-
ments unnecessary, however, since its application is limited to
instances where the debtor is beyond the jurisdiction of the court
or can not be served with process.2' That statute, which became
effective on April 1, 1975, is perhaps more restrictive than the
Mitchell retreat from Fuentes requires.
The final nail in the coffin of ex parte prejudgment garnish-
ment was the Michigan supreme court's decision in Cochran v.
Westwood Wholesale Grocery Co.,"2 which accepted the Solomon
reasoning and concluded that North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem., Inc.,2" which held Georgia's prejudgment garnishment
statute unlawful, was dispositive since the Georgia and Michigan
procedures were similar. Prejudgment garnishment in Michigan
is now limited to those situations when the debtor is outside the
jurisdiction of the court or cannot be served, although the legisla-
ture could, by a fair reading of Mitchell, be less restrictive. Thus,
despite fears expressed by some that Mitchell had overruled
Fuentes," Solomon and Cochrane preserve the primary thrust of
the Fuentes decision in Michigan.
B. Claim and Delivery
Detroit & Northern Savings and Loan Association v.
Woodworth,2 5 in which the Michigan Court of Appeals extended
the thrust of Fuentes, arose under Michigan's post-Fuentes claim
21. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4011(3) (Supp. 1975-76). Corresponding changes
were made in the prejudgment attachment procedure. See id. § 600.4001; MICH. GEN. CT.
R. 735.
22. 394 Mich. 164, 229 N.W.2d 309 (1975).
23. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
24. In his dissent, Justice Stewart argued that Mitchell overruled Fuentes. Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 634 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Justice Powell, on ihe
other hand, contended that Mitchell overruled Fuentes only to the extent that it held the
temporary deprivation of property without notice and hearing a violation of due process.
Id. 623-24 (concurring opinion).
25. 54 Mich. App. 517, 221 N.W.2d 190 (1974).
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and delivery law,21 a statutory procedure fashioned to overcome
the due process deficiencies that Fuentes noted in the Pennsyl-
vania and Florida replevin laws. The revised Michigan procedure
provides that, on the filing of a complaint, the court shall issue
an order directed to the defendant and requiring him to show
cause why the property should not be taken from him and given
to the plaintiff. 27
The issue in Woodworth centered on the hearing element of
the due process requirement. Woodworth, a father of six who
appeared pro se at the hearing, acknowledged that payments on
his mobile home were in arrears, denied that he was letting the
home deteriorate, and argued that it was defective when he ac-
quired it. The trial court, refusing to hear evidence on the ques-
tion of the defect, decided in favor of the plaintiff to which the
installment paper and security interest had been assigned by the
mobile home dealer. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
while Mitchell had overruled Fuentes (except possibly in the bru-
tal need situation,2 an exception upon which Woodworth did not
rely), the debtor's attempts to introduce evidence of defects in the
home were proper under section 2-717 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.2 That section provides that a buyer may deduct from
the price damages resulting from any breach of the contract,
including breach of warranty. The court held that "[t]he trial
court mistakenly forclosed inquiry which the administrative
order permits. 30
The plaintiff argued that the hearing under court rule 75731
should be confined to the issues of (1) whether there was a con-
tract, (2) whether defendant was in default, and (3) whether there
was impairment of the collateral. The court answered that the
rule also requires the trial court to determine that the debtor has
no meritorious defense to the action.3 2
26. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2920 (1968); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 757.
27. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 757.
28. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued that temporary deprivation of
property does not necessarily place the debtor in a brutal need situation and implied that
if such temporary deprivation did give rise to a brutal need, he would reach a different
result. 416 U.S. at 625 (concurring opinion).
29. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2717 (1967).
30. 54 Mich. App. at 523, 221 N.W.2d at 193.
31. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 757.
32. Id. 757.7.
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Woodworth then, in keeping with the philosophy of Fuentes,
but relying instead on the Michigan procedure which Fuentes
spawned, opened the claim and delivery show cause hearing to
questions of breach of warranty or other breaches under section
2-717 which can give the buyer the right to refuse payment to the
extent he has been damaged. The decision expanded the scope of
litigation at the hearing considerably beyond Mitchell which spe-
cifically rejected, as the Woodworth court noted, the notion that
the creditor cannot have possession until he establishes through
the judicial process that all issues are in his favor. Woodworth did
not require such a complete determination, but did require an
inquiry to determine whether possession should be granted the
creditor pending the full trial of those issues, a distinction not
without significance to the creditor and the debtor. It is a far
simpler task to litigate the question of existence of the contract
and the status of payments than questions of breach of warranty
and damages. On the other side of the coin, it is far more difficult
to defend the simpler allegations than it is to defend against
claims of breach of warranty or other breaches which could well
involve the necessity of calling expert witnesses and which inevit-
ably relate to factual matters outside the realm of the knowledge
and experience of the financing institution assigned or holding
the paper in question. These distinctions, which invite introduc-
tion of such issues into the proceeding, will not be lost on the
debtors' attorneys.
In any event, Woodworth set parameters in claim and delivery
more protective for the debtor than Mitchell seemed to compel,
a second instance (the prejudgment garnishment statute being
the first)33 of Michigan procedure which is closer to Fuentes than
to Mitchell.
The Woodworth facts raised an additional question that the
opinion did not treat in detail. A retail installment sales contract
can be a negotiable instrument under sections 3-104 and 3-112 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.34 If the contract in question meets
the requirements of negotiability as set forth in those sections and
if the financing agency is in fact a holder in due course 35 rather
33. See text at notes 15-24 supra.
34. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 440.3104, .3112 (1967).
35. See id. § 440.3302.
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than an assignee, the plaintiff creditor in a claim and delivery
action would be able to forestall the vexation, expense and delay
of litigating questions of the seller's breach of warranty and the
buyer's damages by asserting its rights under section 3-305 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 36 which provides that a holder in
due course takes the instrument free from the defense of breach
of warranty. If the plaintiff in Woodworth was a holder in due
course, he should have been able, therefore, to overcome the argu-
ments raised by the debtor and to sustain the decision of the trial
court refusing to introduce evidence concerning the breach of
warranty. Significantly, however, Michigan legislation37 which
became effective after the date of the Woodworth transaction
prevents a holder in due course from making such an argument
if the sale occured after January 1, 1973. Woodworth treated this
question with only a passing reference to the fact that the defen-
dant attempted to prove that the plaintiff was not a holder in due
course.
C. Self-Help
Sections 9-5033s and 9-50431 of the Uniform Commercial Code
authorize a procedure of self-help for creditors who hold a valid
security interest under other provisions of the Code. Specifically,
section 9-503 provides that unless the parties otherwise agree, a
secured creditor may take possession of the collateral without
judicial process, so long as the retaking can be achieved without
breach of the peace. Cases construing the section hold, further-
more, and the section itself implies, that notice need not precede
such retaking." Section 9-504 complements section 9-503 by giv-
ing the secured party the right to sell or otherwise dispose of the
collateral after retaking, but it does require reasonable notifica-
tion of the sale unless the goods are perishable or threaten to
decline speedily in value. In short, the two sections outline a
summary procedure, without benefit of judicial process, for de-
36. Id. § 440.3305.
37. Id. § 445.865 (Supp. 1975-76).
38. Id. § 440.9503 (1967).
39. Id. § 440.9504.
40. See cases cited notes 52-73 infra.
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priving the debtor first of possession and ultimately title to
his property.
Fuentes, holding that a state statute may not deprive a debtor
of property without notice and hearing, has strong implications
for the self-help procedures outlined by the Code. The majority
opinion in Fuentes referred to self-help, noting that creditors may
proceed without the use of statutory power through common law
destraint1' Justice White's dissent, however, expressed fear that
the majority opinion called into question aspects of state laws
"governing secured transactions. '4 2 Mitchell, of course,
distinguished43 between property which is "exclusively the prop-
erty of the debtor"44 and property in which the debtor's interest
is "no greater than the surplus remaining, if any, after foreclosure
or sale of the property in the event of his default,"4 i.e., property
subject to a vendor's lien or a security interest.
The implications of Fuentes in the self-help area, however,
were sufficiently strong to yield a plethora of cases on self-help
both before and after Mitchell; two of these arose in Michigan
during the last year. Watson v. Branch County Bank,4" decided
by the Federal District Court for the Western District of Michi-
gan, was a class action against several banks. The plaintiff class
consisted of natural persons whose automobiles were financed by
the defendants under security agreements incorporating the self-
help provision of the Code, and who were in arrears on their pay-
ments.47 Clearly, then, in each case the debtor's property interest
was not that exclusively of the debtor, as in Fuentes, but was no
greater than the surplus remaining after sale in the event of the
default, as in Mitchell. That distinction notwithstanding,
Watson held that, because the state is extensively involved in
regulating both the financing of automobile sales and the
repossession scheme itself through the issuance of repossession
41. 407 U.S. at 79 n.12 (1972).
42. Id. 97 (concurring opinion).
43. See notes 10-11 & accompanying text supra.
44. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
45. Id.
46. 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
47. Two of the plaintiffs were not, in fact, in arrears; they were held not to be part of
the class, but continued as individual plaintiffs.
19761
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titles, the retaking involved sufficient state action to fall within
the requirements of the fourteenth amendment; and, since sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504 permit such repossessions without notice
and hearing, those sections are unconstitutional insofar as natu-
ral persons are concerned.
The Watson opinion is lengthy" and written in scholarly
fashion, with frequent reference to early common law authorities
and organic laws;49 its argument includes what the court saw as
current indications of societal dissatisfaction with repossession
practices." A fair reading of the opinion clearly indicates it to be
an instance of a concerned jurist's applying constitutional princi-
ples to meet what he saw to be a felt need.
Redeeming though such features may be, the opinion remains
faulty; first, because it does not fairly take into account an impor-
tant segment of the Mitchell opinion, and second, because it
ignores a substantial body of law which conflicts with the Watson
result.
The Watson opinion, distinguishing Mitchell on the grounds
that Mitchell required judicial supervision of the repossession
process from beginning to end, failed to accord weight to the
property interest distinction which Mitchell took pains to estab-
lish.5' The Supreme Court of the United States established that
distinction; it goes without saying that a district court ought not
disregard it, the criticism by authorities 2 and its own strong feel-
ings to the contrary notwithstanding.
More questionable is the Watson court's failure to answer,
indeed to cite, the substantial body of precedent (admittedly not
binding on a district court in Michigan) which had reached a
contrary result.
Following Fuentes there was a spate of cases in which debtors
claimed that Fuentes effectively outlawed self-help. Twelve fed-
eral district court cases decided prior to Watson rejected those
48. The opinion fills 26 pages in the Federal Supplement Reporter.
49. The opinion cites, among other authorities, Coke, Blackstone, Thomas Aquinas,
the Magna Charta, and the Declaration of Independence.
50. The opinion cites three articles from a Detroit newspaper detailing violence arising
out of self-help repossessions and subsequent court action. 384 F. Supp. at 967 n.17.
51. See notes 10-11 & accompanying text supra.
52. E.g., Revelos, supra note 7, at 293-97.
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arguments,53 as did eight cases by federal courts of appeal. 4 In
addition, ten state court cases, including the highest court in
three states, reached a similar result." One opinion decided after
Watson expressed the view that Mitchell was controlling, 57 but all
of the 30 referred to above were decided prior to Mitchell,55 and
without the benefit of its property interest distinction. Since
Watson, this parade of cases has slackened,59 but, one may pre-
sume, that slackening arises in part because the issue now ap-
pears to be so well settledA" Those post-Watson cases, further-
more, continued the trend of upholding the self-help provision."
53. McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974); Johnson
v. Associate Fin., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp.
355 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.
Mo. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1974); Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Sheldon v.
General Elec. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Colvin v. Avco Financial
Services, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351
F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 879 (D. Colo. 1972);
Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
54. Gibbs v. Teitelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir. 1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust
Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir.
1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 496 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Chirley v. State
Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d
906 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. Kipp v. Cozens, 40 Cal. App. 3d 709, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1974); A&S Excavating,
Inc. v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 31 Conn. Supp. 152, 325 A.2d 535 (Super Ct.
1974); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973); Northside Motors, Inc.
v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC REP. SERV.
739 (N.J. Super. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 402, 295 A.2d
402 (1972); Yankwitt v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1254 (Dist. Ct. N.Y.
1973); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, 265 Ore. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Sandoval v.
American Nat'l Bank, 517 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1973).
56. Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Brown v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 265 Ore. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Sandoval v. American Nat'l Bank,
517 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1973).
57. Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974).
58. See notes 53-55 supra.
59. There have been six. See note 61 infra.
60. Three courts have disposed of the cases with short, per curiam decisions: Brantley
v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit
Corp., 496 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir.
1974).
61. Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974); Teitelbaum v.
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In fact, of the 42 cases which have ever considered the question,
only five other than Watson found section 2-503 a problem. Four
of those cases were federal district court cases62 of which two were
reversed on appeal.63 Of the remaining two, one involved a mobile
home 4 (and arguably falls within the brutal need exception to
Mitchell);65 the other, Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust
Co. ,66 incorrectly assumed that the authorities were about evenly
divided67 and granted that "the issue is close."66 The Boland
court, moreover, simply denied a motion to dismiss without any
pronouncement that the Code sections were unconstitutional.
The fifth case,6" which related to the question of deficiency judg-
ments, was a one page opinion that recited without discussion or
authority that Fuentes had ruled section 9-503 unconstitutional.
In short, had the Watson court considered the authorities, it
might have concluded that there was a paucity of well reasoned
authority for holding self-help provisions unconstitutional and
an abundance of authority, including cases decided by appel-
late and supreme courts, to the contrary. It may be that some of
the cases decided during 1974 had not yet appeared in the ad-
Scranton Nat'l Bank, 384 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Rainey v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 16 UCC REP. SERV. 1436 (Ala. 1975); John Deere Co. v. Catalano, 525 P.2d 1153 (Colo.
1974); King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974); Cook v. Lilly, 208
S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974).
62. Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973);
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub noma. Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Michael v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC
REP. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
63. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.
1974); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
64. Michael v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1972). The overwhelm-
ing majority of the other cases which consider these questions involved the repossession
of an automobile.
65. See note 28 supra.
66. 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
67. The court relied in part on Adams and Titelman, both of which were subsequently
overruled. See note 63 supra.
68. 361 F. Supp. at 919.
69. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP. SEav. 627 (Kings County Ct. N.Y.
1972).
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vance sheets and were not available for the Watson court's refer-
ence; many of the cases, however, were decided prior to 1974. The
length and scholarship of the Watson opinion do not make up for
its failure to consider such a substantial body of cases which
renders it open to the criticism that it is more in the nature of an
advocate's brief than a jurist's opinion.
The scope of the Watson result appears limited. The plaintiff
class was large (all natural persons who finance automobiles), but
the order applied only to the defendant banks.70 Watson's value
as precedent is also limited by two subsequent decisions by the
Sixth Circuit and a decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals
all of which reached contrary results.
In Turner v. Impala Motors,7' decided a little over one month
after Watson, the Sixth Circuit, in a case arising under Tennessee
law, rejected the notion that the Code's self-help provisions vio-
late due process. In Gary v. Darnell,72 the court reached the same
result with respect to the Kentucky Code.
In Hill v. Michigan National Bank,73 furthermore, the
Michigan Court of Appeals followed Turner in affirming the trial
court's summary judgment for the creditor. Significantly, the
court relied, in part, on the fact that the security agreement con-
tained a clause granting the creditor the right to repossess with-
out notice. Such a provision, in the Hill court's view, diminished
the creditor's reliance on the statute and, correspondingly, dimin-
ished state involvement.
In addition, because the debtor had failed to preserve the issue
properly, the Hill court refused to consider his argument that the
contract's repossession clause was unconscionable. Under section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court may find as a
matter of law that a clause is unconscionable and may refuse to
enforce either the clause or the entire contract or limit its applica-
tion to avoid an unconscionable result. It can be argued that the
incorporation into a contract of rights which correspond to those
70. Watson had both a plaintiff class and a defendant class, but the order expressly
applied only to the three banks which were named defendants.
71. 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974).
72. 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974).
73. 58 Mich. App. 430, 228 N.W.2d 407 (1975).
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2302 (1967).
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granted by the Code itself, in sections 9-503 and 9-504, cannot be
unconscionable. Yet the language of subsection (2) of 2-30211
makes it clear that whether a clause is unconscionable depends
upon the commercial setting, purpose and effect of the transac-
tion.
In a word, the Hill case leaves two questions open: first, the
narrow question whether a creditor who retakes in reliance on the
Code without a corresponding clause in the contract has suffi-
ciently invoked state assistance to render the retaking a violation
of due process; and, second, the broader question whether such a
clause is unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, or limited
in its enforcement, say, to situations where the creditor at least
gives notice." The narrow issue is one that attorneys for creditors
will have little difficulty resolving. They will simply incorporate
the language of the Code into a provision of the contract itself.
Resolution of the broader issue will have to abide further litiga-
tion.77
One additional case decided by the United States Supreme
Court bears on the state action question and merits brief men-
tion. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 78 the Court consid-
75.
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause there
of may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2302(2) (1967).
76. There is a dearth of discussion in the self-help cases on the relative interests of
the parties. What, for example, is the danger or cost of giving notice? Of a hearing? How
many debtors would skip? How many would conceal or transfer the property? Such ques-
tions do not lend themselves to easy litigation, but their answers may be indispensable to
a proper resolution of the unconscionability issue, and evidence relating to them' would
clearly be admissible under section 2-302(2). In Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974), one of the few cases in which the parties
martialed evidence of the commercial setting, one expert testified that the cost to the
creditor of notice and hearing would be from 475 to 512 dollars in each instance, and that
from 75 to 95 percent of the motor vehicle retail installment contracts charge the maxi-
mum interest provided by law. In addition, there was testimony that between 70 and 75
percent of all defaults arise because of the inability to pay, 20 to 25 percent because of
dissatisfaction with the seller, and 2 per cent because of billing errors.
77. Surprisingly, the section 2-302 unconscionability issue has not arisen in the self-
help cases. See authorities cited notes 53-64 supra.
78. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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ered whether there was sufficient state action in state approval
of a public utility tariff to bring due process to bear. The tariff
contained a provision permitting the utility to terminate service
to any customer upon reasonable notice of nonpayment of bills
with no opportunity for hearing. The Court refused to extend due
process protection to the customer and, finding that the "initia-
tive comes from [the utility] and not from the State," 9 held that
the utility's exercise of a choice "allowed by state law"80 did not
rise to the level of state action. The Jackson reasoning could
apply to section 9-503 repossession cases which involve the exer-
cise of a choice allowed by state law at the initiative of a private
party.
In the area of self-help, then, the cases indicate that sections
9-503 and 9-504 are not unconstitutional if the security agreement
contains a clause providing for such self-help, except, perhaps, in
the brutal need situation. Where such contractual provisions are
absent, there is some room for litigation, though not much. In the
consumer setting where the debtor has, for example, paid a sub-
stantial portion of the time pay price, the question of unconscion-
ability may still be open. The contrary rule of the Watson case
appears to be an anomoly.
D. Disposition of Collateral
The Michigan Uniform Commercial Code's provision for self-
help not only permit the creditor to retake the security" and sell
it,12 but also permit him to sue the debtor for any deficiency
remaining after the sale.83 Section 9-505(2) 81 limits the right to sue
79. 419 U.S. at 357.
80. Id.
81. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9503 (1967).
82. Id. § 440.9504.
83. Id. § 440.9505(2), which provides:
In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured party
in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of
the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor and
except in the case of consumer goods to any other secured party who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in
the name of the debtor in this state or is known by the secured party in possession
to have a security interest in it. If the debtor or other person entitled to receive
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if the creditor does not sell under certain circumstances; in Jones
v. Morgan,8" the debtor, a co-maker, argued that section 9-505
should be invoked. Subsection 9-505(2) expressly provides that,
upon default, a secured party in possession of the collateral may
propose, by written notice to the debtor, to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of its claim. The subsection gives the debtor thirty
days within which to object to the proposal. In Jones, the creditor
claimed that he was unable to dispose of the collateral, an auto-
mobile, because it was damaged. The debtor argued that section
9-505 gave rights to the debtor as well as the creditor and that
the creditor, by retaining the collateral for 20 months, had
thereby retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The
court of appeals disagreed, seeing section 9-505 as an attempt by
the Code to add to the creditor's arsenal of remedies and not as
a trap for an unwary creditor:
[W]e think the better interpretation of § 9-505(2) is that it is a
provision drafted for the benefit of the secured party by allowing
him the option to retain collateral in satisfaction of the debt in
certain specified situations and where he manifests that intent.86
Debtors' attorneys may ask where the Jones decision leaves them
in the event the creditor fails to obtain a fair price for the
collateral. The Jones opinion's answer, section 9-507,87 which
gives the debtor a claim for damages in such event,58 appears
to be a fair reading of section 9-505(2). Section 9-507 does not de-
prive the debtor of recourse against the creditor who fails to dis-
pose of the collateral promptly, because if such failure causes a
diminution in the proceeds of the sale, the creditor has not acted
notification objects in writing within thirty days from the receipt of the notifica-
tion or if any other secured party objects in writing thirty days after the secured
party obtains possession the secured party must dispose of the collateral under
Section 9-504. In the absence of such written objection the secured party may
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
84. Id.
85. 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975).
86. Id. at 461, 228 N.W.2d at 423.
87. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 440.9507 (1967).
88. See Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220
N.W.2d 83 (1974).
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in the commercially reasonable manner commanded by section 9-
507.81 The debtor's claim which arises by virtue of such noncom-
pliance, moreover', gives him a right of setoff in the creditor's
action to recover the deficiency."
E. Collection Practices Act
Many of the cases discussed above arose out of attempts by
litigants to redress what they see as unfair strength of the credi-
tor, who, in the customary situation, enjoys more ample resources
than his debtor and can rely on a one-sided adhesion contract.9'
In his dissenting opinion in Sniadach,2 Jusice Black decried
judicial attempts to redress that imbalance, which attempts he
saw as a return to the Supreme Court's due process philosophy
of the early years of the Roosevelt presidency. Such an approach,
Justice Black argued, permits the Court to substitute its view of
what is good law for what the legislature thinks is good law.1
3
Mitchell may be an indication that the Supreme Court is more
inclined to accept the Black approach, leaving to legislatures the
challenge of redressing any imbalance. The Collection Practices
Act 4 adopted by the Michigan legislature may be evidence of that
body's willingness to meet such a challenge. The Act, approved
in December of 1974, provides for the licensing of collecting agen-
cies and prohibits certain conduct which smacks of sharp collect-
89. Jones itself so recognized. Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419
(1975); cf. Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 488 P.2d 127 (N.M. App. 1971).
90. "It is not necessary that such damages be affirmatively awarded to the debtor, but
they may instead be set off against the amounts owed by the debtor to the creditor." 58
Mich. App. at 460, 228 N.W.2d at 423; cf. Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal
Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974).
91. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
92. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
93. Justice Black would have accepted Holmes' notions, which are not altogether
popular during these days of judical activism, that his "agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions as law," Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and that "legislatures are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts." Missouri, K.&T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
94. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.211 (Supp. 1975-76). Some of the practices outlawed
include the making of deceptive statements to the debtor, threatening physical violence,
communicating with the debtor directly when he is represented by an attorney, using law
enforcement officers to collect debts, publishing lists of debtors, and buying claims with
the sole purpose of instituting an action thereon. Id. §§ 445.228-.230.
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ing practices and which, most persons would agree, are unfair95
(lawyers should be especially wary of specific provisions relating
to the relationship between an agency and an attorney)." The Act
is a step in the direction of redressing the imbalance, though it is
far from a complete answer to the questions the critics have
raised.
II. SALES
A. Risk of Loss-Shipment Terms
Eberhard Manufacturing Co. v. Brown97 raised a primary
question of who shall bear the loss when a contract for sale con-
tains no shipment terms and a secondary question of what those
terms shall be. In Eberhard, goods were lost in transit, and the
only shipment term in the contract was a direction to the seller
to ship to the buyer's address. Plaintiff seller, suing for the price,
argued that the sale was F.O.B. its plant and attempted to intro-
duce evidence that it always shipped goods that way. The court
held such evidence of usage could not be used to prove that the
parties had agreed on the shipment terms. Relying on section 2-
503,9S the court then held that, absent any shipment terms, the
contract is a shipment contract and not a destination contract.
Since, under section 2-509,19 a shipment contract puts risk of loss
on the buyer once the seller delivers to the carrier, the buyer must
stand the loss.
Clearly the court's reading of 2-503 was correct: comment 5 to
that section specifically provides that under Article 2 of the Code
"the 'shipment' contract is regarded as the normal one and the
'destination' contract as the variant type." ' Equally correct was
the court's holding that the "shipped to" language on the docu-
ments is not sufficient to negate the Code's presumption since a
"shipped to" address is included on nearly all such contracts,
whether they be shipment or destination contracts, so that the
seller can properly instruct the carrier.
95. Id. §§ 445.214-.229.
96. Id. § 445.230.
97. 61 Mich. App. 268, 232 N.W.2d 378 (1975).
98. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2503 (1967).
99. Id. § 440.2509.
100. Id. § 440.2503, Comment 5.
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B. Warranties
Questions of both warranty disclaimer and warranty limita-
tion arose in National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Industries,
Inc., 01 in which the buyer acquired an accounting machine from
the seller after specifying the particular use to which it would be
put and after showing reliance on the seller's skill and expertise.
The factual situation is, thus, a classic instance of a section 2-
315 02 implied warranty for particular purpose. The contract dis-
claimed implied warranties in non-conspicuous language and
limited the buyer's remedy for warranty breach to a correction of
defects.
The court, properly refusing to give effect to the disclaimer
because a section 2-315 warranty can be disclaimed only by con-
spicuous language,103 reasoned that since there was a warranty of
fitness,'04 and since the equipment was not fit, the warranty limi-
tation (to correction of defects only) failed of its essential pur-
pose.0M Accordingly, the court held that the buyer could resort to
any of the remedies allotted to him by the Code, including the
right to revoke acceptance of non-conforming goods."'5
The goods were delivered on November 26; the target date
under the contract for effective performance was January 1, and
the buyer revoked acceptance on January 6. It appears that the
court gave rather short shrift to the seller, assuming that correc-
tion of defects did not encompass modifications or adjustments
sufficient to make the equipment serviceable for the buyer's
needs. Certainly if such changes could have achieved the desired
result, it would be incorrect to hold that the warranty failed of
its essential purpose. Perhaps the court concluded that 41 days
was sufficient time to make any such modifications or adjust-
ments, but it did not say so.
101. 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975).
102. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 440.2315 (1967).
103. Id. § 440.2316.
104. Id. § 440.2316(3)(c).
105. "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." Id. § 440.2719.
106. Id. § 440.2608.
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C. Conduct of the Parties
R. G. Moeller Co. v. Van Kampen Construction Co. 107
prompted questions concerning the scope of section 2-204os which
provides that a contract for the sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. In
Moeller, the buyer ordered replacement parts from seller but re-
fused to pay for them. Seller sued; after seller submitted its evi-
dence, the buyer offered none. On appeal, buyer argued that
the parts ordered were due it under the seller's warranty, that
the statute of frauds applied, and, finally, that the seller failed
to prove a contract. The court rejected the warranty argument
because, under section 2-607(4),119 the burden is on the buyer to
prove breach of warranty, and this buyer had failed to offer any
proof; rejected the statute of frauds defense because the buyer did
not plead it; and rejected the contract argument by resorting to
authority showing that there was an implied contract under the
circumstances.
Unfortunately, in developing the last argument the court neg-
lected to cite section 2-204, which clearly applied under the state
of the evidence. Comment 1 to that section provides that "appro-
priate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to establish an
agreement.""10 When the evidence showed that one party ordered
parts from another who is in the business of selling such parts,
the court should have relied on section 2-204 instead of resorting
to implied contract theories.
II. BAILMENT
Columbus Jack Corp. v. Swedish Crucible Steel Corp."' is a
fresh look at an old bailment rule. The plaintiff-bailor sued to
recover the value of its patterns in the possession of the
defendant-bailee for use in manufacturing products for the plain-
tiff. Prior Michigan law'12 held that the presumption of negligence
107. 57 Mich. App. 308, 225 N.W.2d 742 (1975).
108. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2204 (1967).
109. Id. § 440.2607(4).
110. Id. § 440.2204, Comment 1.
111. 393 Mich. 478, 227 N.W.2d 506 (1975).
112. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Estate of Dennis, 231 Mich. 367, 204 N.W. 89 (1925).
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established by the bailor's proof that he delivered the goods and
that they were destroyed is rebutted when the loss is by fire. In
the absence of that presumption, the bailor must prove that the
bailee was negligent, a difficult task in a fire situation. Acknowl-
edging that Michigan held to the minority rule, the court over-
turned the earlier decision and held the presumption is not rebut-
ted by evidence of loss by fire.
The Columbus Jack result recognized implicitly that such
cases as this are subrogation cases, that good risk bearers (insur-
ance companies) are the real parties in interest, and, tacitly, that
there is little that serves the public interest in requiring proof of
as potentially difficult an issue as the cause of a fire for recovery.
The moral is: bailees must now insure all property in their posses-
sion.
IV. USURY
Michigan courts turned back attempts by consumers in two
cases to expand the scope of the Michigan usury law."' Under
that statute, any lender who charges more than the statutory
maximum interest rate of 7 percent cannot recover any interest
or other such charges; but the statute omits any reference to
recovery of the money loaned or to a cause of action on behalf of
the debtor to recover the excess interest."4 In Michigan Mobile
Home Owners Association v. Bank of the Commonwealth, "'5 a
class action, plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages on the
grounds that the contracts required a higher rate of interest than
the statute permitted."' In Sienkiewicz v. Leonard Mortgage
Co.,' 7 plaintiffs sought to recover interest they paid which alleg-
edly exceeded the 7 percent maximum. In both cases, the courts
refused to alter the well established rule that Michigan's usury
113. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.31 (1967).
114. Id. § 438.32.
115. 56 Mich. App. 206, 223 N.W.2d 725 (1974).
116. The suit arose because of the position taken by the Attorney General, Mich. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 4729 (June 21, 1971), that mobile homes were motor vehicles and therefore
could not come within the Retail Installment Sales Act's higher interest rate. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967). The Retail Installment Sales Act was amended in 1972
to make it clear that mobile homes are included within its coverage. Id. § 445.852(c)
(Supp. 1975-76).
117. 59 Mich. App. 154, 229 N.W.2d 352 (1975).
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statute can be used as a shield but not a sword. The rule is
consistent with the language of the statute, which provides re-
lief against actions by the lender, and with prior case law, includ-
ing decisions by the Michigan supreme court."' Any change in
this rule would be more proper for the legislature than for the
courts.
V. BANKING
Cases in the Survey period relating peculiarly to banking
practices involved joint accounts and garnishments. In Mary v.
Louis,"I a careless response to a garnishment writ yielded an
embarassing result. The bank answered that it was not liable to
the principle debtor when, in fact, it held payables of the debtor
which more than secured its loan. The appellate court reversed
summary judgment for the bank and held that since the creditors
sustained the losses as a result of the bank's failure to disclose the
face value of the payables, the bank was liable.
In Richard v. Richard, 2 the court gave vigorous support to the
presumption which arises out of the execution of a joint account
signature card. Under section 703 of the Michigan Financial Insti-
tutions Act, 2' the existence of a joint account is prima facie evi-
dence, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, of the intention
of the depositor to vest title to the deposit in the survivor. While
that presumption, the court held, is rebuttable, 22 evidence that
the depositor did not return the permanent signature card with
the signature of both depositors did not overcome the presump-
tion created by the "temporary" card she signed when she made
the initial deposit.
Both Richard and Louis are eminently sensible. Surely the
garnishment statute's requirement that the garnishee respond
includes an obligation of good faith, and it should not surprise a
banker, savings and loan officer, or executor to learn that he can
rely on the first card the depositor signs even though the second
118. See, e.g., Wright v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Mich. 315, 297 N.W. 505 (1941); Union
Guardian Trust Co. v. Crawford, 270 Mich. 207, 258 N.W. 248 (1935).
119. 57 Mich. App. 14, 229 N.W.2d 352 (1975).
120. 58 Mich. App. 660, 228 N.W.2d 512 (1975).
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.703 (1967).
122. 58 Mich. App. at 662-63, 228 N.W.2d at 514, citing Kirilloff v. Glinisty, 375 Mich.
586, 134 N.W.2d 707 (1965); Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958).
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card the depositor takes home with him for his joint tenant to sign
is never returned.
Of additional significance to the banking community is an
opinion issued by the Attorney General relating to automated
teller machines and other terminal equipment.1 The Attorney
General confronted the question whether the use of an automated
teller machine by a state chartered credit union to disperse on the
spot cash advances complies with the requirements of section 10
of the Michigan Credit Union Act.' 24 That section permits credit
unions to advance loans to members but implies that a loan based
on an unsigned advance must be made by a check payable to the
order of the buyer. 25 The automated teller machine in question,
activated by the use of a personal identification number which
the member punches into the machine, distributes the loan in
cash.
The Financial Institutions Bureau, concerned that the pro-
ceeds of the loan were payable in cash, asked whether a personal
identification number can be a signature for the purposes of sec-
tion 10. Relying on the Uniform Commercial Code definition of
"signature" as including any "word or mark used in lieu of a
written signature"'2 6 and the Code Comments which indicate that
the signature may be "by mark or even by thumb print,' 27 the
opinion concluded that the electronic "mark" effected by the use
of the number with the automated teller machine complies with
any statutory requirement for a signature.
While the personal identification number does not fall within
the class of examples set forth in the Code, which anticipates
some mark the eyes can perceive, the Attorney General's conclu-
sion is consistent with the liberal construction the Code re-
quires.'2 The Code Comments and definition are evidence of a
disposition clearly favorable to any reasonable identifying symbol
and, while not anticipating an electronic mark such as the per-
123. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 4864 (April 10, 1975).
124. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 490.10 (Supp. 1975-76).
125. "Unsigned requests for advances on a pre-approved line of credit or open end
revolving credit loan can be honored by check payable to the order of the borrower.
Id.
126. Id. § 440.3401(2) (1967).
127. Id. § 440.3401, Comment 2.
128. Id. § 440.1102.
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sonal identification number, appear to favor the Attorney Gen-
eral's conclusion. The opinion should serve as a promising start-
ing point for inquiries which will surely arise in the future as the
use of automated teller machines increases.
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Two significant cases construed Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as adopted in Michigan;12 9 both of them related to
financing statements and deficiency in the description of the
debtor. Section 9-402'10 of the Code provides that the financing
statement must include the name of the debtor. It is clear, more-
over, from section 9-403(4),31 that such information is necessary
in order to serve the Code's notice filing scheme. A financing
statement which incorrectly sets forth the name of the debtor is,
therefore, defective because it cannot serve its purpose of putting
third persons on notice of the filing period.'32
In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.'3 involved a financing
statement which incorporated the name of the debtor correctly
but failed to reflect the fact, which the secured party knew at the
time of filing, that the debtor was to change its name shortly
thereafter. That fact rendered the filing useless to third persons
unaware of the change once it was effected: the secured party had
complied with the literal terms of the Code but had not troubled
itself with the problem the name change might visit upon inno-
cent third persons.
In fact the problem arose not in the form of such an innocent
third person, but in the guise of a trustee in bankruptcy who took
the status of such innocent person and sued the secured party
which had retaken the collateral. The Sixth Circuit felt that
129. Id. §§ 440.9101-.9507.
130. Id. § 440.9402.
131.
Except as provided in subsection (7) a filing officer shall mark each statement
with a consecutive file number and with a date and hour of filing and shall hold
the statement for public inspection. In addition the filing officer shall index the
statement according to the name of the debtor and shall note in the index the
file number and the address of the debtor given in the statement.
Id. § 440.9403(4).
132. See In re Thrift Shoe Co., 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974).
133. 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974).
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meeting literal requirements of section 9-402 was insufficient in
light of the Code's ubiquitous requirement of good faith. Under
section 1-203,'1' every duty within the Code carries with it "an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."','
The court concluded that the duty to file a financing statement
required a meaningful financing statement and not one which the
secured party knew would soon become ineffectual. Accordingly,
it held the defendant's security interest unperfected and rendered
judgment for the trustee in its preference action.
The result is unsettling because the good faith argument is
diluted by two facts: first, the name change did not occur for
some eleven months; and second, no one was misled by the incor-
rect description of the debtor in the statement. The length of the
delay indicated not that the secured party was acting in bad faith
at the time of the filing but that it was acting in bad faith some
eleven months later when the name change occurred. The opinion
referred to no evidence that the secured party knew when the
change became effective, and the court's suggestion, that the
original filing could have contained a request for dual indexing,
is no solution because the debtor assumed the secured party's
name; dual indexing would have created a cloud on the secured
party's property. It is a suggestion, moreover, that is more likely
to occur to a court after the fact than to an attorney acting in the
first instance; failure of the secured party to follow that sugges-
tion is hard to accept as an example of bad faith.
The court's conclusion, furthermore, overlooks the fact that
filings under the Code often become misleading because creditors
have no express duty to refile in the event of a name change.
Admittedly, the court confined its holding to cases where the
secured party knew of the impending change at the time of the
original filing; it would not be far removed, however, for a court
to hold, on the authority of this case, that any creditor who learns
of a name change and does not correct his filing is guilty of bad
faith.
Finally, the facts of this case do not cry out for the application
of the good faith rule. If the plaintiff had been a party who ad-
134. MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 440.1203 (1967).
135. Id.
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vanced funds after a search which did not reveal the filing, or if
the secured party were asserting its lien against after acquired
property, the equitable imbalances would be more appropriate for
application of section 1-203. Significantly, the 1972 Code amend-
ments include the addition of section 9-402(7) which requires a
secured party to file after a name change only to perfect his secu-
rity interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after that change. 36
It is not too much to ask potential creditors to check for name
changes within preceeding years and run a search under prior
names. Nothing in Kalamazoo will protect creditors from changes
when the creditor does not know about them at the time of the
filing, so such inquiry is probably good practice in any event.
Indeed, in Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust and Savings
Bank, 37 in which there was no evidence that the secured party
knew of the name change at the time of the original filing, the
Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the notion that the secured
party must refile after a name change, holding that any filing
which is good ab initio remains good.
136. UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 9-402(7).
137. 57 Mich. App. 1, 225 N.W.2d 209 (1974).
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